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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ms. Jensen appeals from the district court's Amended Order of Restitution, 
ordering restitution over seven years after she was sentenced to fixed life in 2001. 
Ms. Jensen contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to order restitution 
because the State failed to demonstrate any reason why the delay in filing for restitution 
was necessary. Ms. Jensen also contends that the restitution order should be reduced 
or vacated because the district court abused its discretion in ordering $22,500 in 
restitution in light of her lack of financial resources, needs, and ability to pay. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedin~s 
On March I ,  2001, a Judgment of Conviction was entered, sentencing 
Ms. Jensen to fixed life for murder. (R.27465, pp.194-95; R.36018, p.56.)' This 
judgment made no mention of restitution; however, a restitution hearing was scheduled 
for April 17, 2001, and rescheduled for April 24, 2001. (R.27465, pp.f94-95; R.36018, 
pp.10, 56.) The April 24, 2001 hearing was also vacated and a restitution hearing was 
never held. (R.36018, pp. 10, 56.) A Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
was filed providing "updated restitution paperwork to the defense, stating at that time 
$14,745.86 had been paid out by the Industrial Commission; however, no motion for 
restitution or restitution order was ever filed and the case proceeded through the 
appellate process. (R.27465, pp.201-04; R.36018, pp.1 I, 56.) Ms. Jensen's sentence 
' An Order taking augmenting the previous record and transcript in Supreme Court file 
27465, was issued by the Idaho Supreme Court on January 13,2009. (R.36018, pp.81- 
82.) 
was affirmed in March 2002, and a remittitur was entered in June 2002. Stafe v. 
Jensen, 137 ldaho 240, 46 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2002); (R.36018, pp.11, 56.) Other than 
the release of exhibits to the parties in 2004, no other action took place in Ms. Jensen's 
case until 2007. (R.36018, pp11-13, 56.) 
Over six years after Ms. Jensen was sentenced and five years after the remittitur 
was issued following her appeal, on July 13, 2007, an Order of Restitution was filed in 
the district court ordering Ms. Jensen to pay $22,500 in restitution. (R.36018, pp.14-15, 
56.) On May 21, 2008, a written letter from Ms. Jensen was filed asking about the 
status of her request to proceed with an untimely appeal filed March 5, 2008. (R.36081, 
p.18.) On June 30, 2008, an "Appeal of Order of Restitution" was filed requesting relief 
under ldaho Criminal Rule 60(b) and arguing that the restitution order was "brought in 
an untimely manner" and that she was not notified of any hearing on the restitution 
order. (R.36081, pp.19-20.) Following a letter from the district court explaining the file 
did not contain a request to proceed with an untimely appeal filed in March 2008, a copy 
of a Motion to Proceed with an Untimely Appeal was filed. (R.36081, pp.24-26.) 
Following a hearing on the matter, the district court subsequently issued a 
Memorandum Opinion Re Motion to Extend Appeal Time and Motion Pursuant to Rule 
60 B to Set Aside Judgment (hereinafter, Opinion). (R.36081, pp.36, 43-59.) In this 
Opinion, the district court set aside the Order of Restitution pursuant to 60(b) because 
Ms. Jensen "did not have actual notice of the State's ultimate restitution request" and 
Ms. Jensen did not "have the opportunity to present evidence relevant to the issue of 
restitution as required by I.C. § 19-5304 (6)." (R.36081, pp.57-58.) The court also 
noted that ''the record is devoid of explanation why the State waited 5 years from 
resolution of the criminal case to submit a restitution order." (R.36018, p.56.) 
The State filed a Motion for Amended Order of Restitution again requesting 
$22,500.00 in restitution. (R.36081, pp.62-64.) In response, counsel for Ms. Jensen 
filed an Objection to Proposed Order of Restitution and Memorandum arguing that 
Ms. Jensen is incarcerated for life and it "is not anticipated to be able to discharge the 
proposed restitution" and the applicable statute does not address what entity is 
anticipated to request execution of judgment. (R.36081, pp.65-67.) Therefore, 
Ms. Jensen asked that the district court not grant the State's proposed Order of 
Restitution after considering the factors set forth in I.C. 3 19-5304 and § 19-5305. 
(R.36081, p.67.) 
A restitution hearing was subsequently held where counsel for Ms. Jensen 
argued that restitution should not be ordered given the long delay in such an order and 
based on her individual circumstances, including her ability to pay. (Tr., p.36, L.14 - 
p.37, L.13, p.57, L.10 - p.59, L.22.) The district court ultimately ordered restitution in an 
Amended Order of Restitution and Ms. Jensen filed a timely Notice of Appeal from that 
order. (R.36081, pp.70-77.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to order restitution in Ms. Jensen's case? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. Jensen to pay 
$22,500 in restitution in light of her inability to pay? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Order Restitution In Ms. Jensen's Case 
The district court lacked jurisdiction to order Ms. Jensen to pay restitution in this 
case because the delay of over six years from her judgment of conviction was not a 
necessary delay. In Idaho, it is generally recognized that criminal courts have no power 
or authority to direct reparations or restitution to a crime victim in the absence of a 
statutory provision to such effect. State v. Richmond, 137 ldaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 
796 (Ct. App. 2002). ldaho Code section 19-5304 provides authority for the district 
court in a criminal case to order the payment of restitution to the victims of the 
defendant's crime. Id. Therefore, the trial court's exercise of discretion in requiring 
restitution must be within the boundaries provided in this statute. Sfafe v. Cheeney, 144 
ldaho 294, 296, 160 P.3d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, the interpretation of 
this statute is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free review. 
Id.; Sfate v. Waidelich, 140 ldaho 622, 623, 97 P.3d 489, 490 (Ct. App. 2004). 
ldaho Code section 19-5304(6) specifically provides that "[rlestitution orders 
shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed 
necessary by the court." I.C. 3 19-5304(6) (emphasis added.); see also State v. 
Ferguson, 138 ldaho 659, 67 P.3d 1271 (2002). In Ferguson, the ldaho Court of 
Appeals stated, "[tjhis section contemplates that that the court may need to grant the 
prosecution a reasonable amount of time necessary to gather information so as to 
locate all the victims and correctly compute the amount of restitution." Ferguson, 138 
ldaho at 662, 67 P.3d at 1274 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, it is the State's 
obligation to demonstrate that the delay in an entry of the order of restitution was 
necessary. Id. In Ferguson, the order of restitution was entered after the defendant 
had been discharged from probation and his case closed. Id. The court found that the 
jurisdiction to enter restitution under section 19-5304 was not limitless stating, "[ilt does 
not, however, vest the court with the power to extend the entry of the order of restitution 
beyond the closing of the case and discharge of the defendant." Id. Unfortunately, to 
what extent "a reasonable amount of time necessary" extends was not discussed 
beyond the context of that case and no other appellate cases in ldaho have dealt with 
this issue. 
In other contexts, the ldaho Supreme Court has been reluctant to grant 
jurisdiction to criminal court's beyond that which is provided for by statute. In Sfafe v. 
Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 2003), the ldaho Supreme Court noted that it has 
"long recognized that a court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside the judgment in a case 
does not continue forever." 139 at 554, 79 P.3d at 713. The Court went on to find that 
"absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend 
or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of 
the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." Id. at 355,79 P.3d at 714. 
In State v.Taylor, 142 ldaho 30, 121 P.3d 961 (2005), the Court found that under ldaho 
Code $$ 19-2601 (4) the district court's jurisdiction under the retained jurisdiction statute 
in effect at that time expired after 180 days and the district court could no longer place 
the defendant on probation once that time period had passed. Id. at 31, 121 P.3d at 
962. 
Furthermore, in a similar context, the ldaho appellate courts have determined 
that when a Rule 35 motion is filed by a defendant, the district court must rule on it 
within reasonable time or it looses jurisdiction. See State v. Day, 131 ldaho 184, 185, 
953 P.2d 624, 625 (Ct.App.1998) (quoting Sfate v. Chapman, 121 ldaho 351, 354, 825 
P.2d 74, 77 (1992)). In State v. Nickerson, 123 ldaho 971, 974, 855 P.2d 56, 59 (Ct. 
App. 1993), the ldaho Court of Appeals found that although "no action was taken on 
Nickerson's motion to reduce his sentence for approximately one year while the appeal 
from the judgment proceeded," the district court ruled on the motion within a reasonable 
period of time. Id. Therefore, the district court did not lose jurisdiction to act on 
Nickerson's Rule 35 motion. Id. at 975, 855 P.2d at 60. However, the ldaho Court of 
Appeals has noted that thirty-four months is an unreasonable amount of time, when no 
justification for the delay was given. State v. Payan, 132 ldaho 614, 619, 977 P.2d 228, 
233 (Ct. App. 1998). In Payan, the Court of Appeals held that the district court lost 
jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 35 motion in light of this delay. The ldaho Court of 
Appeals has held that it is ultimately defense counsel's responsibility to request that the 
district court make a ruling on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable time frame, or 
otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for the delay, to avoid the risk of 
the trial court losing jurisdiction. Day, 131 ldaho at 186, 953 P.2d at 626. Similarly 
when requesting restitution, it is the State's burden to make the restitution request and it 
should be the State's burden to follow up with the district court to ensure that the 
restitution request is being acted on within a reasonable time frame and that any delay 
is justified as necessary. 
Here, when ruling on the State's motion for restitution, the district court 
mistakenly concentrated on whether the delay in filing the order of restitution prejudiced 
September 22, 2008, and December 15, 2008, after the Order of Restitution was 
originally filed, and that a hearing scheduled for November 10, 2008, was vacated. 
The State did not present any evidence or argument regarding why it was 
necessary to wait six years before asking that restitution be ordered. Instead, the 
prosecutor explained that previously Ms. Jensen had refused to agree to the restitution 
amount and that the sentencing judge advised Ms. Jensen that she needed to provide 
reasons or file paperwork regarding why she was contesting restitution, otherwise the 
order would be granted. (Tr., p.52, Ls.2-18.) That judge then "left to do water court and 
then he left to do something else." (Tr., p.52, ls.2-18.)~   he prosecutor then stated: 
I'm perfectly happy to concede that, you know, we should have 
been more diligent in making sure that that was done. In fact, I think that 
the way we discovered that it was not done is when we adjusted the figure 
for the other two defendants, there was no figure to adjust for Miss 
Jensen. And I could be leaving some things out. This is from the best of 
my memory, and as I indicated, you know, calling witnesses on this wasn't 
our intention on this today. That's how I think we got here. 
And then we found out that there was no restitution order for Miss 
Jensen. We approached [the interm district court judge assigned to the 
case]. He signed the order, which is the order that she was ultimately 
made aware of.. . 
(Tr., p.52, L.19 - p.53, L.8.) The State also argued that even if there was a delay in 
seeking restitution "it certainly didn't operate to her detriment." (Tr., p.60, Ls.3-5.) 
None of this information provided by the prosecutor provided a reason why a 
delay of over six years was necessary for restitution to be ordered. The fact 
Ms. Jensen would not agree to the restitution amount and that she wanted a hearing or 
It should be noted that by 2004 a new judge had been assigned the case, when the 
motion for release of exhibits was filed. (R.36018, p.11.) This judge was still assigned 
to the case when the Order of Restitution was granted in 2007. (R.36018, p.11.) 
9 
Ms. Jensen as opposed to whether it was necessary, which is the standard provided for 
in ldaho Code section 19-5403. In making its findings the district court stated: 
ldaho Code Section 5304(6) says restitution should be requested at 
the time of sentencing or at a later date. This case does present a lot of, I 
guess the best word I can use is anomalies, a change of status of the 
previous sentencing judge. Frankly, I think the situation where this case 
sort of fell through the cracks, I hate to use that word so strongly. . . .but I 
think that is what [the prosecutor's office] is recognizing and I understand I 
think that's what happened. 
The question in my mind is whether that delay has in any way 
prejudiced the position of the defendant in this case. I conclude it has not. 
(Tr., p.65, Ls.3-15.) However, whether Ms. Jensen was prejudiced is not the correct 
standard. As noted above, the correct standard is whether the delay was necessary. 
See I.C. § 19-5403. Here, the district court's findings do not indicate that the delay was 
necessary to determine the amount of restitution, 
Furthermore, the State failed to demonstrate that the delay was necessary "to 
gather information so as to locate all the victims and correctly compute the amount of 
restitution." See Ferguson, 138 ldaho at 662, 67 P.3d at 1274. At the restitution 
hearing, the State noted that at the previous hearing it had discussed why the delay in 
restitution was so long stating: 
Obviously at the previous hearing we did discuss what happened 
and why the state ultimately got a restitution order so much later than it 
ordinarily would. We discussed how that was tied up with the previous 
attorney in this case on the defense side and with the judge and then 
various things that resulted in obviously our office actually seeking an 
order from [the interim district court judge], which was much later than it 
would have been normally ... 
(Tr., p.35, Ls.15-23.) However, there was nothing on the record at the previous hearing 
indicating why there was a delay in filing the restitution order. (See Tr., p.4, L.6 - p.32, 
L.19.) Furthermore, the register of actions only indicates that hearings occurred on 
wanted to be able to provide information regarding the restitution amount, simply means 
that Ms. Jensen was asking the district court to follow the provisions of ldaho Code 
section 19-5304(6), which requires the State to prove the amount of restitution by a 
preponderance of the evidence and provides that either side has a right to present 
evidence relevant to the issue. I.C. § 19-5304(6). The State was still obligated to 
pursue its request for restitution regardless of whether the defense wanted to contest it. 
However, the State did never even filed a motion for restitution in this case. (See 
R.36018, pp.6-13.) 
The State failed to provide any reason why the delay of over six years was 
necessary in this case. Therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter the 
restitution order without a showing of such a necessity and the Amended Order of 
Restitution should be vacated. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Jensen To Pay $22.500 
In Restitution In Her Case 
Ms. Jensen contends the district court abused its discretion when it ordered her 
to pay $22,500 in restitution in light of her lack of financial resources and earning ability 
while incarcerated for life. The district court's decision to order restitution is committed 
to the trial court's discretion, with consideration to the factors articulated in ldaho Code 
section 19-5304(7) as well as the policy of favoring full compensation to crime victims 
who suffer economic loss. State v. Bybee, 115 ldaho 541,543,768 P.2d 804,806 (Ct. 
App. 1989). Those factors include consideration of the amount of economic loss 
sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, as well as the financial resources, 
needs, and earning ability of the defendant, and other factors deemed appropriate by 
the court. I.C. § 19-5403(7); Sfafe v. Hamilton, 129 ldaho 938, 942, 935 P.2d 201, 205 
(Ct. App. 1997); Sfate v. Bybee, 115 ldaho 541, 768 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1989). In 
reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court looks at whether the 
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Stafe v. Powell, 125 ldaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994). 
Here, Ms. Jensen contends the district court did not give adequate consideration 
to her financial resources, needs and earning ability in light of the fact she will be 
incarcerated for the rest of her life. At the restitution hearing, Ms. Jensen testified that 
she makes about $.20 an hour, and she works about 40 hours a week. (R., p.50, L.20 - 
p.51, L.2.) Ms. Jensen explained that the fees for some of her medical services, such 
as some of her medications, doctor visits, and dental care, all come out of her prison 
account. (Tr., p.42, Ls.5-25.) Ms. Jensen explained that the restitution is taken out of 
whatever money comes into her account, whether through her employment while 
incarcerated or through her family or friends, and that when she has medical or legal 
fees to pay those are deducted from her account putting her into a negative balance. 
(Tr., p.45, Ls.9-19.) Ms. Jensen also explained that they were currently withholding 
50% of her money to go to the order of restitution, but she was advised that they could 
withhold 100% at any time. (Tr., p.50, Ls.2-11.) Therefore, Ms. Jensen contends that 
the district failed to adequately consider Ms. Jensen's lack of financial resources, 
needs, and earning ability, and therefore, her restitution order should be reduced or 
vacated accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Jensen respectfully requests that the Amended Order of Restitution in her 
case be vacated. Alternatively, she asks this Court to reduce the restitution order as it 
deems appropriate or remand her case to the district court for further proceedings, 
DATED this 6th day of July, 2009. A n 
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